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There is much discussion of the relationships between crime, inequal-
ity, and unemployment. We construct a model where all three are
endogenous. We ￿nd that introducing crime into otherwise standard
models of labor markets has several interesting implications. For ex-
ample, it can lead to wage inequality among homogeneous workers.
Also, it can generate multiple equilibria in natural but previously un-
explored ways; hence two identical neighborhoods can end up with
di⁄erent levels of crime, inequality, and unemployment. We discuss
the e⁄ects of anti-crime policies like changing jail sentences, as well
as more traditional labor market policies like changing unemploy-
ment insurance. (JEL: D83, J64)
The economics of crime is obviously important. At the turn of the millen-
nium 2.1 million people in the US were in prison or jail, rising to 6.3 million if
we include those on probation or parole; to put this in perspective, 5.7 million
people were unemployed. There is, of course, much work on the relationships
between crime, unemployment, and inequality.1 A novel feature of our study is
that all three of these variables will be made endogenous using an equilibrium
search model. This allows us to highlight various interactions among the vari-
ables (e.g., how crime a⁄ects the unemployment rate and vice-versa), and, more
generally, to discuss some general equilibrium e⁄ects that seem to have been
neglected in the literature. A key ￿nding is that introducing criminal activity
into otherwise standard models of the labor market can signi￿cantly a⁄ect the
predictions of these models.
1For example, once crime is incorporated, models that implied a single wage
may now generate wage dispersion. Also, models that had a unique equilibrium
can now generate multiple equilibria in natural but previously unexplored ways.
A channel of multiplicity that we emphasize is this. Suppose there are lots
of good (high wage) jobs available. Then workers are less inclined to criminal
activity, and this makes it easier for a given ￿rm to pay a wage high enough
to keep its workers honest. This strategic interaction in wage setting yields
multiple equilibria. Thus, two identical neighborhoods may end up with very
di⁄erent amounts of crime, which is interesting in light of recent empirical work
(e.g. Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote and Jose A. Scheinkman 1996) that
￿nds it is di¢ cult to account for the high variance in crime rates.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the worker￿ s problem
taking wages as given. This provides a natural extension to the textbook job
search model to incorporate crime. Section 2 analyzes wage setting. This shows
how various types of equilibria with di⁄erent crime rates can arise for di⁄erent
parameter values, and how sometimes multiple equilibria coexist, with di⁄erent
amounts of crime, inequality, and unemployment. In this section we also discuss
the relation between our model and some related literature, including other
models of wage dispersion, and the e¢ ciency wage model; as we discuss, there
is a sense in which one can tell an economic story that is very similar to the
e¢ ciency wage story, although the crime model does has some key di⁄erences
both in assumptions and predictions. Section 3 discusses several extensions.
Section 4 concludes.
2I. Crime and Job Search
There is a [0;1] continuum of homogeneous workers and a [0;N] continuum
of homogeneous ￿rms.3 All agents are in￿nite lived and risk neutral. For now all
we say about ￿rms is that each posts a wage w that it is willing to pay to anyone.
Let F(w) be the distribution of wages posted. At any point in time workers
are either employed (at some w), unemployed, or in jail. Let the numbers in
each state be e, u, and n, and the payo⁄ or value functions be V1(w), V0, and
J. Unemployed workers consume b and receive i.i.d. wage o⁄ers from F at rate
￿0. Employed workers consume w, receive i.i.d. o⁄ers from F at rate ￿1, and,
in addition to leaving for endogenous reasons ￿e.g. they may change jobs or
go to jail ￿are also laid o⁄ exogenously at rate ￿. Jailed workers consume z,
receive no o⁄ers until released, and are released into unemployment at rate ￿,
which for simplicity is constant.
Employed (unemployed) workers also encounter opportunities to commit
crimes at rate ￿1 (￿0). A crime opportunity is a chance to steal some amount
g that is ￿xed for now but will be endogenized below. Let ￿1(w) (￿0) be the
probability that an employed (unemployed) worker commits a crime given an
opportunity. Let ￿ be the probability of being caught and sent to jail, where for
convenience, you are either caught instantly or not at all. Then the expected
payo⁄ from crime for an employed (unemployed) worker is K1(w) (K0), where
K0 = g + ￿J + (1 ￿ ￿)V0 (1)
K1(w) = g + ￿J + (1 ￿ ￿)V1(w): (2)
3Hence, the crime decision satis￿es:
￿0 =
￿
1 if V0 ￿ J <
g
￿





1 if V1(w) ￿ J <
g
￿




Employed and unemployed workers also fall victim to crime at rate ￿. Below
we will close the model by relating ￿ to the endogenous decisions ￿0 and ￿1(w),
but it facilitates the discussion to ￿rst present the case where ￿ is exogenous.
This can be rationalized by saying that workers in the model commit crimes
against agents in other neighborhoods but not in their own. Alternatively,
crime could be ￿victimless￿￿there is no problem if ￿ = 0, or if we reinterpret
￿ > 0 as a tax. In any case, ￿ will be independent of ￿0 and ￿1(w) until Section
3. When victimized an employed (unemployed) worker su⁄ers a loss ‘1(w) (‘0).
For now we set ‘1(w) = ‘0 = ‘ exogenously, but we also discuss how this can be
generalized below.
Given the probability is 0 that two or more events ￿e.g. a crime and a
job opportunity ￿occur simultaneously, Bellman￿ s equation for an unemployed
worker is
rV0 = b ￿ ￿‘ + ￿0￿0(K0 ￿ V0) + ￿0Ex maxfV1 (x) ￿ V0;0g; (4)
where r is the rate of time preference. In words, the ￿ ow return to being
unemployed rV0 equals instantaneous net income plus the expected value of
receiving either a crime or job opportunity. Similarly,
rV1 (w) = w ￿ ￿‘ + ￿ [V0 ￿ V1 (w)] + ￿1￿1(w)[K1 (w) ￿ V1 (w)]
+￿1Ex maxfV1 (x) ￿ V1 (w);0g (5)
rJ = z + ￿(V0 ￿ J) (6)
4are Bellman￿ s equations for an employed worker and for one in jail.
Workers need to decide whether to accept a job and whether to commit a
crime. In terms of the ￿rst decision, ￿rst note from (5) that V1(w) is increasing
in w. This implies that an employed worker will accept any outside o⁄er above
his current wage, and an unemployed worker will accept any w ￿ R, where R
is the reservation wage de￿ned by V1 (R) = V0. In terms of the crime decision,
observe from (2) that K1 (w) ￿ V1 (w) is decreasing in w, and that K0 ￿ V0 =
K1 (R)￿V1 (R). The former observation implies workers are less likely to commit
crimes when their wages are higher, and the latter implies the unemployed
engage in crime i⁄ workers employed at R do. Thus, if ￿0 = 0 then ￿1(w) = 0
for all w, and if ￿0 = 1 then ￿1(w) = 1 for w < C and ￿1(w) = 0 for w ￿ C,
where C > R is the crime wage de￿ned by K1(C) = V1(C).4 By (2), at w = C
the gain just equals the expected cost of crime, which is the chance of losing
one￿ s job and going to jail: g = ￿ [V1 (C) ￿ J].
We now show how to solve for R and C. For the reservation wage, ￿rst
equate (4) to (5) evaluated at w = R and rearrange to yield









1 (x)[1 ￿ F (x)]dx (8)
after integrating by parts. Consider ￿rst the case ￿0 = 0, which means the last
term in (7) vanishes. Then di⁄erentiate (5) and insert V 0




[1 ￿ F (x)]dx
r + ￿ + ￿1 [1 ￿ F (x)]
: (9)
5Inserting (9) into (7) yields one equation in R. Indeed, in the case ￿0 = 0, this is
simply the reservation wage equation from the standard model, as summarized
in Dale T. Mortensen (1986), for example.
Consider now the case ￿0 = 1, which means ￿1(w) = 1 i⁄ w < C for some




[1 ￿ F (x)]dx




[1 ￿ F (x)]dx
r + ￿ + ￿1 [1 ￿ F (x)]
: (10)
Also, since the last term in (7) no longer vanishes, subtract (6) and (4) to get
V0 ￿ J =
b ￿ z ￿ ￿‘ + ￿0g + ￿0￿(R)
r + ￿ + ￿0￿
: (11)
Inserting (11) and (10) into (7) yields the reservation wage equation when ￿0 =
1. In this case we also need the crime wage equation. Using g = ￿ [V1 (C) ￿ J]
and (5),
C = z + ￿‘ + (r + ￿)
g
￿
+ (￿ ￿ ￿)(V0 ￿ J) ￿ ￿1￿(C); (12)
where ￿(C) is the function ￿(R) evaluated at R = C. Inserting (11) and (10)
into (12) gives the desired result.
To summarize, one possible case is K0 ￿ V0 < 0, which implies ￿0 = 0 and
￿1(w) = 0 for all w. The other possibility is K0 ￿V0 > 0, which implies ￿0 = 1
and at least the unemployed commit crime, while the employed do i⁄ w < C.
Obviously worker behavior depends on F(w); e.g., if F(C) = 0 no employed
worker commits crime. When we endogenize F, it will depend on R and C, and
we have a ￿xed point problem to be analyzed below. However, even taking F as
given we think this is an interesting extension of the standard job search model,
since it makes predictions about the e⁄ects of many variables on R and C, and
6hence on unemployment and crime rates.5 This is especially easy if ￿0 = ￿1 = ￿
and ￿0 = ￿1 = ￿, since then (7) yields R = b, and we can focus on C.
In this case, one can show @C=@z > 0 and @C=@￿ > 0, e.g., so more ￿pleas-
ant￿or shorter jail terms raise C and make employed workers more likely to
commit crime. Also, @C=@￿ < 0, so higher apprehension rates make them less
likely to commit crime, and @C=@￿ > 0, so higher victimization rates (or taxes)
make them more likely, because this makes legitimate activity less attractive.
Also, @C=@￿ < 0 at least if ￿g is not too big, so more opportunities make
workers less inclined to crime. Also, @C=@b is proportional to ￿￿￿; intuitively,
an increase in b makes legitimate employment more attractive, since things are
not so bad even if you get laid o⁄, but also makes crime more attractive, since
things are not so bad upon release if you go jail, and the net e⁄ect depends on
what happens faster, a layo⁄ or release.
We now solve for steady state. We assume w ￿ R with probability 1, but we
do not necessarily impose ￿0 = ￿1 = ￿ and ￿0 = ￿1 here. Then, if ￿0 = 0 (no
crime) we have u = ￿=(￿ + ￿0) and e = ￿0=(￿ + ￿0), exactly as in the standard
model. If ￿0 = 1 the labor market ￿ ows are shown in Figure 1, where eL is the
number of workers employed at w < C, eH = e￿eL is the number employed at
w ￿ C, and ￿ = 1 ￿ F(C) is the fraction of ￿rms o⁄ering at least C. Solving
for steady state yields
eL = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿0=￿ n = [(￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿)￿0 + ￿1￿0(1 ￿ ￿)]￿￿=￿
eH = (￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1)￿￿￿0=￿ u = (￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿)￿￿=￿
(13)
where ￿ is the constant that makes eL + eu + u + n = 1.
7INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The unemployment rate is U = u
1￿n and, in any equilibrium with ￿0 = 1,
the crime rate is c =
u￿0+eL￿1
1￿n , where we emphasize that we use the non-
institutionalized population in the denominator. One can now derive the e⁄ects
of di⁄erent policy changes on these variables. For example, suppose we change z,
b or ￿ in such a way that C falls, as discussed above. The only e⁄ect this has on
(13) is to increase ￿, and one can check that this reduces n, u, U, and c. Hence,
anti-crime policies like harsher jail terms, changes in unemployment insurance,
or neighborhood improvement programs to reduce victimization, given that they
lower C, reduce the number in jail, the number unemployed, the unemployment
rate, and the crime rate.
We now derive the distribution of wages paid, say G(w), which generally
di⁄ers from the distribution of wages posted, F(w). Consider ￿rst the case ￿0 =
1. Let FL (w) = F(wjw < C) and FH (w) = F(wjw ￿ C) be the conditional
distributions of wages posted and let GL (w) = G(wjw < C) and GH (w) =





￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)FL (w)






￿ + ￿1￿ [1 ￿ FH (w)]
: (15)
Eliminating u, eL and eH using (13),
GL (w) =
FL (w)
1 + kL [1 ￿ FL (w)]
and GH (w) =
FH (w)




￿+￿1￿+￿1￿ and kH = ￿1￿
￿ . Given F and ￿ = 1 ￿ F(C), these are
the conditional distributions of observed wages when ￿0 = 1. The results when
￿0 = 0 can be found by setting ￿ = 1.
One can derive the conditional densities by di⁄erentiating (16), and the
unconditional density is given by G0(w) = eL
eL+eH G0
L(w) if w < C and G0(w) =
eH
eL+eH G0
H(w) if w > C. Using (13),
G0(w) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿ kLF0(w)
f￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1[1 ￿ F(w)]g
2 if w < C
￿ kHF0(w)
f￿ + ￿1[1 ￿ F(w)]g
2 if w > C
(17)
where ￿ kL =
￿(￿+￿1￿+￿1)(￿+￿1￿+￿1￿)
￿+￿1￿￿+￿1￿ and ￿ kH =
￿(￿+￿1￿+￿1)(￿+￿1￿)
￿+￿1￿￿+￿1￿ . Suppose we
change z, ￿, ￿ or b so C falls from C1 to C0. As these parameters a⁄ect the
wage density only through ￿, it is relatively easy to see that G0(w) shifts down
for w < C0 and for w > C1 while it shifts up for w 2 (C0;C1). Hence, when the
crime wage falls we end up with fewer workers in the tails of the distribution and
more in the middle of the distribution. Therefore, anti-crime policies like those
discussed above not only reduce crime and unemployment, they also reduce
wage inequality.
One can perform other experiments, although some are more complicated.
For example, an increase in ￿1 a⁄ects c, U and G directly, and also indirectly
through C. In any case, we want to proceed to models where the wage o⁄er
distribution F is endogenous. It is well known that a model with on-the-job
search generates wage dispersion even without crime (Burdett and Mortensen
1998). Therefore, in the next section we focus on the case of no on-the-job
9search (￿1 = 0), where the model without crime implies there must be a single
wage; then we will be able to conclude that crime in and of itself can generate
wage dispersion. The version with ￿1 > 0 is analyzed in detail in Burdett, Lagos
and Wright (2002).
II. Wage Posting Equilibrium
As discussed, here we set ￿1 = 0 and ￿0 = ￿ > 0. Also, to reduce notation
we set ￿0 = ￿1 = ￿, and assume that ‘1(w) = ‘0 = g ; i.e. the loss from
being victimized is independent of one￿ s income and equal to the gain from
crime. Until the next section we continue to assume ￿ is exogenous; again, one
could say workers only victimize agents in other neighborhoods, or that crime
is ￿victimless￿and ￿ is a tax.7 We assume each ￿rm has linear technology with
marginal product p > b, and posts a wage at which it hires all workers that it
contacts. Each ￿rm takes as given the wages of other ￿rms as described by F,
and worker behavior as described by (R;C). We assume ￿rms maximize steady
state pro￿t.
Clearly, there will be at most two wages posted in equilibrium: each ￿rm
either posts R or C. To see this, ￿rst note that ￿rms paying w < R attract no
workers, so they must post at least R. Suppose ￿0 = 0. Then ￿1(w) = 0 for
all w ￿ R, and any ￿rm posting w > R makes more pro￿t posting R. Hence,
if ￿0 = 0 all ￿rms post w = R (a case of the well known result by Peter A.
Diamond 1971). Now suppose ￿0 = 1. Then ￿1(w) = 0 i⁄ w ￿ C for some
C > R, and ￿rms paying below C lose workers faster than those paying above
C because their workers sometimes commit crime, get caught, and go to jail.
10Still, any ￿rm paying w > C could make more pro￿t if it reduced its wage to C,
while any ￿rm paying w 2 (R;C) could make more pro￿t if it reduced its wage
to R. Hence, ￿0 = 1 implies all ￿rms post either R or C.
So when ￿0 = 0 all ￿rms post R, and when ￿0 = 1 the equilibrium o⁄er
distribution can be summarized by R, C, and the fraction ￿ posting C. In the
latter case a ￿rm posting R hires workers at rate ￿u=N (since the number of
workers contacting a ￿rm is ￿u and there are N ￿rms per worker) and loses them
at rate ￿+￿￿, so in steady state it has LR = ￿u=(￿ + ￿￿)N workers. Similarly,
a ￿rm posting C will have LC = ￿u=￿N workers. Steady-state pro￿ts are ￿R =
(p ￿ R)LR = (p ￿ R)￿u=(￿ + ￿￿)N and ￿C = (p ￿ C)LC = (p ￿ C)￿u=￿N.
Pro￿t maximization obviously implies
￿ =
￿
1 if ￿C > ￿R
0 if ￿C < ￿R
(18)
and wage dispersion (0 < ￿ < 1) requires ￿C = ￿R. Also, given there are at
most two wages posted, we write VR and VC for workers￿value functions.
Bellman￿ s equations can now be simpli￿ed a lot. Consider the case ￿0 = 0,
which we call a Type N equilibrium (N for ￿no crime￿ ). In this case, since all
￿rms post R
rV0 = b ￿ ￿g (19)
rVR = R ￿ ￿g; (20)
where we have used ‘ = g (victim￿ s loss equals criminal￿ s gain). Now V0 = VR
implies R = b. This constitutes an equilibrium i⁄(3) holds ￿i.e., i⁄V0￿J ￿
g
￿.
11Subtracting (19) and (6) we see that, given r ￿ = 0,
V0 ￿ J =
b ￿ z ￿ ￿g + ￿￿0g + ￿￿g=￿
￿ + ￿￿￿0 + ￿￿
: (21)
Hence, ￿0 = 0 is an equilibrium i⁄ b ￿ b where
b = z + ￿g + ￿g=￿. (22)
It will also follow from the analysis of other possible cases below that no other
equilibrium can exist when b > b.
We summarize the above discussion as follows, where to facilitate the pre-
sentation we ignore nongeneric cases like b = b.
Proposition 1. A Type N equilibrium exists i⁄ b > b; if it exists it is unique.
Now consider ￿0 = 1, which means the unemployed commit crime and the
employed do at w = R but not w = C. Bellman￿ s equations become
rV0 = b ￿ ￿g + ￿￿ (VC ￿ V0) + ￿[g + ￿ (J ￿ V0)] (23)
rVR = R ￿ ￿g + ￿[g + ￿ (J ￿ V0)] (24)
rVC = C ￿ ￿g + ￿ (V0 ￿ VC): (25)
We can solve these for the value functions given (R;C;￿), then insert the solu-
tions into the reservation and crime wage equations, V0 = VR and VC￿J = g=￿,
to get R and C as functions of ￿ and parameters,
R(￿) = b +
￿￿





C (￿) = b +
￿ ￿ ￿





where b was de￿ned above in (22).
12Given these solutions for C (￿) and R(￿), the pro￿t di⁄erential across high-
and low-wage ￿rms ￿C ￿ ￿R is, after some algebra, proportional to





￿ + ￿￿ + ￿￿
(28)
where ￿￿ = ￿ (￿ + 2￿￿)=￿￿. Thus, when ￿0 = 1 the possible equilibria are
as follows. A Type L equilibrium (L for ￿low crime￿ ) has ￿ = 1 and requires
T(1) > 0; in this case no employed workers, but only unemployed workers,
commit crime. A Type H equilibrium (H for ￿high crime￿ ) has ￿ = 0 and
requires T(0) < 0; in this case everyone commits crime. A Type M equilibrium
(M for ￿medium crime￿ ) has ￿ 2 (0;1) and requires T(￿) = 0; in this case
there is wage dispersion, and low wage workers commit crime while high wage
workers do not.
To describe when these di⁄erent equilibria exist, it is convenient to de￿ne












￿ + ￿￿ + ￿
: (30)
We will break things into two cases, ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ < ￿￿, which determines the
sign of p0(b) ￿ p1(b), p0
0(b), p0
1(b), and T0(b).
Proposition 2. Assume b < b and ￿ > ￿￿. Then p0 < p1, p0
j > 0, T0 < 0 and
(a) if p > p1 (b) there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type L;
(b) if p < p0 (b) there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type H;
(c) if p0 (b) < p < p1 (b) there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type M.
Proof. The results p0 < p1, p0
j > 0 and T0 < 0 are obvious. Given b < b there
is no Type N equilibrium by Proposition 1. Existence of the other equilibria is
13easy: the conditions in (a), (b), and (c) are equivalent to T(1) > 0, T(0) < 0,
and T(0) > 0 > T(1), which means there is an equilibrium with ￿ = 1, ￿ = 0,
and ￿ 2 (0;1), respectively. Uniqueness follows from T0 < 0. See Figure 2(i). ￿
Proposition 3. Assume b < b and ￿ < ￿￿. Then p0 > p1, p0
j < 0, T0 > 0 and
(a) if p > p0 (b) there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type L;
(b) if p < p1 (b) there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type H;
(c) if p1 (b) < p < p0 (b) there are exactly equilibria, one Type L, one Type
H and one Type M.
Proof. Everything is the same as the previous proof, except that in the case
￿ > ￿￿ we have T0 > 0, and so T(0) < 0 < T(1) implies there are exactly 3
equilibria, one each with ￿ = 1 (Type L), ￿ = 0 (Type H), and ￿ 2 (0;1) (Type
M). See Figure 2(ii). ￿
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The set of equilibria are shown in (b;p) space in Figure 3 where panels (i)
and (ii) correspond to the two cases ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ > ￿￿. In either case, there
is no crime if b > b = z + ￿g + ￿g=￿ ￿e.g. if z is small (jail is bad), ￿ is
small (sentences are long), or ￿ is big (crime is risky). When b < b, at least the
unemployed commit crime, and the employed do i⁄ p is low. Intuitively, low p
means ￿rms are not willing to pay enough to keep their workers honest, while
high p means they are willing, because then turnover is more costly. Another
way to say it is this: an increase in p raises revenue faster at high wage ￿rms
than low wage ￿rms, since the former have more workers, and so for large p
all ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to post C. Just how high p has to be to eliminate
14crime depends on parameters, but also on beliefs, since there can be multiple
equilibria (more on this below).
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
To say more about the properties of the di⁄erent equilibria, ￿rst solve T(￿) =














This can be inserted into (26) and (27) to get R and C as functions of parameters
in the Type M equilibrium. To get R and C in Type L or H equilibrium, set
￿ = 1 or ￿ = 0. The equilibrium wage correspondence is shown in Figure 4.
The cases are: ￿ < ￿ which implies @C=@b < 0, and also implies ￿ < ￿￿ which
means we have multiple equilibria for some b, as shown in panel (i); and ￿ > ￿
which implies @C=@b > 0 and has two subcases, either ￿ < ￿￿ or ￿ > ￿￿, which
means either multiplicity or uniqueness, as shown in panels (ii) and (iii). Note
that our statements about @C=@b refer to Type L and H equilibria, as R and C
are actually independent of b in Type M equilibrium. Also notice C and R can
be higher in Type L than Type H equilibrium, or vice-versa. Also notice C ￿R
decreases with b, reaching 0 at b when we enter a Type N equilibrium.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
We can also solve for the steady state, and then for the unemployment
and crime rates.8 Using superscripts to indicate the equilibrium (e.g. UN is
the unemployment rate in Type N equilibrium), it can easily be shown that
15UN = UL < UM < UH and cN < cL < cM < cH. Hence, across equilibria the
crime and unemployment rates move together, although of course we cannot
say one causes the other. In terms of inequality we have: in both Type N
and Type H equilibria everyone earns b; in Type L equilibrium all employed
workers earn C(1) > b; and in Type M equilibrium a fraction ￿￿ earn C(￿￿)
while the rest earn R(￿￿), where b < R(￿￿) < C(￿￿). Notice workers prefer a
low or medium crime equilibrium to no crime ￿at least, holding victimization
constant ￿ since it is the possibility of crime that makes some ￿rms o⁄er a
premium wage to keep their workers honest. Crime does not help workers in
a high crime equilibrium, however, where ￿rms give up trying to keep them
honest and simply pay w = R = b.
It is worth discussing multiplicity further. Notice that multiple equilibria
can only arise here when ￿ is relatively small ￿i.e. jail sentences are relatively
long ￿since we need ￿ < ￿￿ to get T0 > 0. It would not work if, say, we only
￿red criminals (this case is captured by letting ￿ ! 1, which from Proposition
3 implies uniqueness). More substantively, multiplicity is interesting because it
implies that two otherwise identical neighborhoods can end up in very di⁄er-
ent situations, say one in a Type L equilibrium where all employed workers earn
C > b and there is little crime or unemployment, and the other in a Type H equi-
librium where all workers earn b and there is lots of crime and unemployment.
It is the fact that there are high-wage jobs available in the ￿rst neighborhood
that deters people from crime, and it is the fact that people are less inclined to
commit crime that makes it pro￿table for ￿rms to pay the relatively high wage
16C. This source of multiple equilibrium seems new; clearly, it can only arise in
models with endogenous wage setting.
In terms of policy implications, consider for example a change in b. First
suppose that ￿ < ￿￿ as in panel (ii) of Figure 3, so that pj(b) < 0, where p0(b)
and p1(b) are de￿ned in (29) and (30). Then for a range of p, as b rises we move
from a high crime to a low crime equilibrium with an intervening interval where
multiple equilibrium exist. Alternatively, if ￿ < ￿￿ so that pj(b) > 0, as in panel
(i) in Figure 3, then for a range of p as b rises we move from low to medium to
high crime. Hence, the e⁄ect on crime of an increase in b depends critically on
parameter values. Although of course b in the model is meant to capture many
things, including the value of leisure, other nonmarket activity, and so on, to the
extent that at least part of b includes unemployment insurance, the conclusion
is that changes in unemployment insurance can have fairly complicated e⁄ects
on crime and the labor market.
As another example, suppose we make jail worse by reducing z. Then when
we redraw the existence regions in the Figure, the following happens: given
(b;p), if we were in a Type L equilibrium we can switch to a Type N equilibrium;
if we were in a Type M equilibrium we can switch to a Type N or L equilibrium;
and if we were in a Type H equilibrium we can switch to Type N, L or M
equilibrium. In all cases, crime can only fall. Changes in the other policy
variables can be similarly analyzed. The point is that even though things get
a little complicated with multiple equilibria, some fairly straightforward policy
predictions come out of the model.
17We close this section with a few comments on some labor literature. First,
there is a connection between our framework and e¢ ciency wage theory, such
as Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984). In their model, paying strictly
above the reservation wage keeps workers from shirking, while here it keeps them
from crime, which a⁄ects pro￿t through turnover since criminals sometimes
get caught and go to jail. In this sense the models are similar. However,
standard e¢ ciency wage models have a unique equilibrium and all ￿rms pay
the same wage, while here we can have multiple equilibria and we can have
wage dispersion.9 Also related is the James W. Albrecht and Bo Axell (1984)
model, which generates wage dispersion by assuming workers are heterogenous
with respect to b. In that model, posting a higher w increases a ￿rm￿ s in￿ ow of
new workers, while here it decreases a ￿rm￿ s out￿ ow of workers. Still, in both
models the advantage of a higher w is that the ￿rm will have more workers,
which is o⁄set by a lower pro￿t per worker.
III. Extensions
In the previous section we took the victimization rate ￿ to be constant.
While this can be justi￿ed, we now endogenize ￿ by equating it to the crime
rate c, which seems interesting for its own sake and also allows us to identify a
new source of multiplicity. If ￿0 = 0 then c = 0; if ￿0 = 1 then c =
(u+eL)￿
1￿n and
￿ = c implies
c = c(￿) =
[￿ + ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + (￿ + ￿￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
: (32)
The method of analysis is the same as before except we replace ￿ by c.
Thus, in the previous section we have ￿0 = 0 when b > b = z + ￿g + ￿g=￿,
18and the same is true here except the relevant threshold is endogenous,
b = ^ b[￿(￿)] = z + ￿(￿)g + ￿g=￿; (33)
where ￿(￿) = 0 if ￿0 = 0 and ￿(￿) = c(￿) if ￿0 = 1. Notice c0(￿) < 0, and
^ b(0) < ^ b[c(1)] < ^ b[c(0)]. Hence, if agents believe we are in a Type N equilibrium
the threshold is low, if they believe we are in a Type L equilibrium it is high, etc.
This leads to the following result, the proof of which we omit since it simply
involves checking when ￿0 = 0 a best response.10
Proposition 4. A Type N equilibrium exists i⁄ b ￿ ^ b(0); it is unique if b >
^ b[c(0)] = ^ b(￿).
Now consider equilibria with ￿0 = 1. Let ^ T be the generalized version of T,
de￿ned in (28), with b replaced by ^ b[￿ (￿)],
^ T (￿) = p ￿^ b[c(￿)] ￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)f^ b[c(￿)] ￿ bg
￿ + ￿￿ + ￿￿
: (34)
Equilibrium implies ￿ = 1 if ^ T (1) > 0, ￿ = 0 if ^ T (0) < 0, and ^ T (￿) = 0 if
￿ 2 (0;1). We begin the analysis of this case under the parameter restriction
￿￿ = ￿. This allows us to focus on the impact of endogenizing ￿, because it
implies ^ T (￿) would be constant if ￿ were ￿xed (with ￿ = ￿￿, as ￿ rises both
C and R rise but ￿C ￿ ￿R remains constant, eliminating strategic interaction
in wage setting). Hence, if we ￿nd multiple equilibria here it is unambiguously
because ￿ is endogenous. Once this point has been made, we will then relax
￿￿ = ￿ and argue that the key economic results are in fact robust.
We report the results in several steps that apply to progressively higher
values of b. For each range of b we give existence and uniqueness/multiplicity
19results for di⁄erent values of p.
Proposition 5. Let ￿ = ￿￿ and suppose b < ^ b(0). Then,
(a) if p > ^ b[c(0)] there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type L;
(b) if p < ^ b[c(1)] there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type H;
(c) if ^ b[c(1)] < p < ^ b[c(0)] there are exactly equilibria, one Type L, one Type
H and one Type M.
Proof. Since b < ^ b(0) we have ￿0 = 1 (recall the previous footnote). Now the
existence of Type L, H, and M equilibria simply means ￿nding conditions such
that ^ T (0) ￿ 0, ^ T (1) ￿ 0, and ^ T (0) < 0 < ^ T (1), respectively. These conditions
are exactly those in (a), (b), and (c). Moreover, ￿ = ￿￿ implies ^ T0 > 0, which
guarantees uniqueness of an equilibrium of any type. ￿
While the restriction ￿ = ￿￿ is useful for demonstrating that multiplicity
here is due to the endogeneity of ￿, it is not actually used in the proof except
to guarantee that ^ T is monotone. In fact, ^ T is monotone 8￿ ￿ ￿￿, and indeed,
by continuity, also for some ￿ > ￿￿. Hence, the key results apply much more
generally.11 For ￿ very big, however, ^ T can be nonmonotone. In this case things
are slightly more complicated; e.g. even if ^ T(0) > 0 as in case (a) of the
Proposition, we still know there must either be an equilibrium with ￿ = 1 or
￿ 2 (0;1) but we cannot be sure of which, and there could be one of each
or multiple Type M equilibria (imagine the right panel of Figure 2 with T
nonmonotone). But if the point is to show the existence of multiple equilibria
and wage dispersion, we do not require any restriction on ￿. Again, ￿ = ￿￿ is
assumed mainly to show multiplicity can be due exclusively to endogenous ￿.
20Having established this, we return to the case ￿ = ￿￿ and take up the results
for a di⁄erent range of b (things generalize here as in the previous paragraph to
￿ 6= ￿￿).
Proposition 6. Let ￿ = ￿￿ and suppose ^ b(0) < b < ^ b[c(1)]. Then all the
equilibria in Proposition 5 exist under the same conditions, plus a Type N equi-
librium.
Proof. Since ^ b(0) < b it has already been established that Type N equilibrium
exists. Since b < ^ b[c(1)] the unemployed will choose ￿0 = 1 for any c(￿) ￿ c(1).
The rest of the argument is the same as Proposition 5. ￿
Finally we consider what happens for b larger than ^ b[￿ (1)] but still below
^ b[￿ (0)].
Proposition 7. Let ￿ = ￿￿ and suppose ^ b[￿ (1)] < b < ^ b[￿ (0)]. Then,
(a) if p > ^ b[￿ (0)] there is a unique equilibrium and it is Type N;
(b) if p < ^ b[￿ (0)] there are exactly equilibria, one Type N, one Type H and
one Type M.
Proof. Since ^ b(0) < ^ b[￿ (1)] < b it has already been established that Type
N equilibrium exists. The restriction in (a) is equivalent to ^ T (0) > 0, and
^ b[c(1)] < b implies that the unemployed choose ￿0 = 0 if ￿ = c(1), so an
equilibrium of Type L cannot exist. Hence the Type N equilibrium is unique
under the conditions in (a). Next, note that b < ^ b[c(0)] implies the unemployed
choose ￿0 = 1 if ￿ ￿ c(0). This together with the condition in (b), which
is equivalent to ^ T (0) < 0 < ^ T (1), implies an equilibrium of Type H exists
if p < z + ￿g=￿ + ￿g. To ￿nish the proof of (b), we construct a Type M
21equilibrium. First note that ^ T (0) < 0 < ^ T (1) implies there exists a unique ￿
satisfying ^ T (￿) = 0, or equivalently, satisfying p = z + ￿g=￿ + c(￿)g. Finally,
the unemployed set ￿0 = 1 because b < ^ b[c(￿)] = z + ￿g=￿ + c(￿)g = p, and
therefore an equilibrium of Type M exists. ￿
The results are illustrated in Figure 5. With ￿ ￿xed, this ￿gure (or equiv-
alently Figure 3 with ￿ = ￿￿) would look very di⁄erent: there would be an
exogenous b such that b > b implies the unique equilibrium is Type N, and b < b
implies the unique equilibrium is Type L if p > b and Type H if p < b. Hence,
equilibrium wage dispersion and multiple equilibria here are due to endogenous
victimization. The economic intuition is simple: if you live in a neighborhood
with lots of crime then life on the street, while still better than jail, is not that
great, and this makes you more inclined to commit crime. This e⁄ect seems
very general, and should be relevant in any model where crime is endogenous.12
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
While there are many other ways one could extend things, we brie￿ y mention
just two. First, instead of ￿rms posting wages, suppose w is determined by
bargaining. One could use the generalized Nash solution where workers have any
bargaining power ￿ 2 [0;1], but for simplicity we set ￿ = 1, which implies w = p.
Second, we endogenize the return to crime by setting ‘0 = ￿b, ‘1(w) = ￿w, and
g = ￿! where ! =
ep+ub
e+u is the expected income of a victim. Hence, the victim￿ s
loss ‘ and the perpetrator￿ s gain g are both a fraction ￿ of the former￿ s income.
We continue to endogenize ￿ = c, but for simplicity we set ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = ￿
so that we only have to determine ￿ = ￿1(p) and not ￿0. Bellman￿ s equations
22are now
rV0 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)b + ￿(V1 ￿ V0) (35)
rV1 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)p ￿ ￿ (V1 ￿ V0) + ￿￿[￿! ￿ ￿ (V1 ￿ J)]: (36)





￿+￿+￿￿￿ in terms of ￿. To determine ￿ we check the sign of V1￿J￿ ￿!
￿ ,
which, after some algebra, is proportional to S (￿) = A + B￿ where A and B
depend on the underlying parameters.13 Equilibrium implies ￿ = 0 if S (0) > 0,
￿ = 1 if S (0) < 0, and S(￿) = 0 if ￿ 2 (0;1). One can show that, given
b, for low p we have a unique equilibrium with ￿ = 1, for high p we have a
unique equilibrium with ￿ = 0, and for intermediate p we can either have an
equilibrium with ￿ 2 (0;1) or all three equilibria. Although the model cannot
generate wage dispersion, since w = p for all workers, it can generate multiple
equilibria with di⁄erent crime and unemployment rates, and equilibria where
some workers commit crime while others do not. So at least some of the key
results are robust to various changes in modeling assumptions.
IV. Conclusion
We have developed a search equilibrium framework that can be used to
analyze the interrelations between crime, unemployment, and inequality. An
equilibrium model is essential to analyze feedbacks that can lead to multiplic-
ity. Search theory was used because it not only generates unemployment and
inequality endogenously, it also allows us to incorporate criminal opportuni-
ties and victimization in a natural way. The framework is a rich but still very
23tractable extension of the standard search model. We found that introducing
crime generates several interesting e⁄ects, including novel sources of wage dis-
persion and multiple equilibria. The model has many implications for the e⁄ects
of policy and other variables on crime, unemployment, wages, etc. Of course,
the model is simple, but it can easily be extended in many ways.
For example, one can analyze wage posting equilibria with on-the-job search.
One can also include endogenous search e⁄ort, an entry (or location) decision,
and heterogeneity. With heterogeneous agents, presumably some never engage
in crime while others always do; we focused on a representative marginal worker
who may or may not engage in crime, depending on his employment status and
wage, and also on general economic conditions. It would also be good to try
to explain lower o⁄er arrival rates for those previously convicted of a crime,
which may be hard in the current set up but perhaps not in a version with
heterogeneity and private information. One could also consider workers who
steal directly from their employers. This all seems feasible, but we thought
it best to work out the simple model ￿rst. The main messages ￿say, about
multiplicity and wage dispersion ￿ should survive these extensions, and the
tools we developed ￿say, for deriving the endogenous wage distribution G from
any o⁄er distribution F ￿will still be useful.
Multiple equilibria are relevant given that otherwise similar cities or neigh-
borhoods can seem to end up with very di⁄erent crime rates. One of our channels
for multiplicity is quite simple: if you live in a neighborhood with lots of crime,
the relative returns to legitimate activity are low, and this encourages crime.
24The channel working through wage setting is more subtle, but we think that it
is not empirically implausible. There is certainly evidence that youth crime is
sensitive to labor market conditions, including unemployment rates and wages
(e.g., Je⁄ Grogger 1998 and Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg and David B.
Mustard 2002). It is not hard to believe that some employers in some neigh-
borhoods are concerned with turnover resulting from potential criminal activity
by their employees, although we do not have hard evidence on this. In any
case, concerning multiplicity the main point is merely that when local labor
market conditions are good the incentive for crime is reduced, and this makes
it relatively easy to maintain good labor market conditions.
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1. A small sample would include Gary S. Becker (1968), Raaj K. Sah (1991),
Alexander Tabarrok (1997), John Fender (1999), and Ayse • Imrohoro… glu, Anto-
nio Merlo and Peter Rupert (1999, 2000); see Samuel Cameron (1988) and
Richard B. Freeman (1996) for surveys. Chien-Chieh Huang, Derek Laing, and
Ping Wang (2002) is a recent contribution that is quite related to what we do.
2. We also explore the following channel of multiplicity: when the crime rate
falls the relative bene￿ts to legitimate activity increase, reducing the incentive
to be a criminal. We neglect other sources of multiplicity (e.g. congestion in
law enforcement) that are discussed elsewhere.
3. Assuming homogeneity makes it clear that equilibrium wage dispersion
is generated by the option to commit crime, and not by ex ante heterogeneity;
however, allowing for heterogeneity is empirically relevant and not very hard.
One should interpret the representative agent in our model as a marginal type
in the real world: although there may be some people who will always, or will
28never, engage in criminal activity, we are interested in those who may, or may
not, depending on individual and neighborhood economic conditions.
4. Notice our tie-breaking rules always go the ￿right￿way: agents accept a
job when w = R and forego crime when w = C. This must be so in equilibrium
when wages are endogenous.
5. It is useful to derive results for an arbitrary F distribution, and not only
for the one that comes out of the wage-posting equilibrium in the next section,
because the equilibrium F depends critically on some details of the environment
(e.g., whether we allow on-the-job search). Moreover, it is possible to derive
any F as an equilibrium under some assumptions ￿simply assume ￿rm-speci￿c
productivity and use bargaining rather than wage posting. So while it can be
important to model wages explicitly, it can also be interesting to analyze things
for an arbitrary F.
6. Given w ￿ R, for any w < C the number of workers employed at a wage




GL (w)eL = ￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)FL (w)u
￿f￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1￿ + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ FL (w)]geLGL (w):
Setting the time derivative to 0 yields (14). A similar method yields (15).
7. We also assume V0 ￿ J, which holds i⁄b ￿ z+￿g￿(￿￿ + ￿￿)
g
￿; otherwise
unemployed agents would volunteer for jail.
298. For the record, the steady states are
eL
































where the superscript indicates the type of equilibrium, and ￿ is the constant
that makes eM
L + eM
H + uM + nM = 1.
9. Whether one can augment e¢ ciency wage theories in a simple way to
generate multiplicity and wage dispersion is an open question. In those models
an agent caught shirking loses his job but is not sent to jail, and recall that jail
is needed for multiplicity. As an aside, note that this aspect of our model (jail)
also helps to avoid a well known problem in the e¢ ciency wage literature, which
is that when a worker is caught shirking the ￿rm really has no incentive to follow
through with the threat of ￿ring him. Here the relevant threat is enforced by
the criminal justice system.
10. Let ￿0 be the best response to any ￿0, given ￿. We know ￿0 = 0 i⁄
V0 ￿ J ￿ g=￿, where in general
V0 ￿ J =
b ￿ z ￿ ￿g + ￿￿0g + ￿￿g=￿
￿ + ￿￿￿0 + ￿￿
:
Therefore, letting B(￿;￿;￿0) = z + ￿g ￿ ￿g￿0 + (￿ + ￿￿￿0)g=￿ we have:
￿0 =
￿
0 if b ￿ B(￿;￿;￿0)
1 if b < B(￿;￿;￿0)
Since ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 in a Type N equilibrium, it exists i⁄b ￿ B(0;1;0) = ^ b(0).
Moreover, since c(0) = ￿, if b ￿ B(￿;0;1) = ^ b[c(0)] then ￿0 = 0 even if everyone
else were a criminal, and so the Type N equilibrium is the unique possibility.
3011. The statement of the Proposition would have to be amended slightly if
￿ 6= ￿￿ since then the thresholds for p would not simply be the constants ^ b[c(1)]
and ^ b[c(0)], but rather functions ^ p[b;c(1)] and ^ p[b;c(0)], where
^ p[b;c(￿)] = ^ b[c(￿)] ￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿)f^ b[c(￿)] ￿ bg
￿ + ￿￿ + ￿￿
:
When ￿ = ￿￿, ^ p[b;c(￿)] does not depend on b; this explains why in Figure 5
below the lines delineating the regions are horizontal (compare with Figure 2).
12. Endogenous ￿ implies an additional channel for multiplicity if we assume
a victim￿ s loss is an increasing function of his income, say ‘1(w) with ‘0
1 > 0.
Now a fall in ￿ induced by an increase in ￿ allows ￿rms to reduce C relative
to R ￿i.e. @C=@￿ > @R=@￿ > 0. In this case crime acts like a proportional
tax, and an increase in ￿ is like a reduction in the tax rate, which bene￿ts
high-wage more than low-wage workers. Hence, with a increase in ￿ it is once
again relatively cheaper to pay C and a strategic interaction in wage setting
reappears.
13. For the record, setting r ￿ = 0 and normalizing b = 0 to reduce the
clutter, we have A = [(￿ + ￿)(￿ + ￿)￿ ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿ + ￿)￿￿]p ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)
2 z and
B = ￿￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ + ￿)p ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)(￿ + ￿ + ￿￿)z.
31